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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RON DOUGHERTY and JUDITH A. 
DOUGHERTY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC UTILITIES 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 13854 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The plaintiffs and respondents agree substantially 
with the statement of the kind of case made by the defendant 
and the appellant to the effect that the plaintiffs desire 
the enforcement of the money judgment against the defendant 
California-Pacific Utilities Company for damages to plaintiffs1 
culinary well and to the basement of their home and for the 
cost of hauling culinary water to their home resulting from 
the defendant's negligence allowing water to overflow the 
banks of its canal during and following a severe rain and 
hailstorm. The only argument pertaining to this statement 
of the kind of case would apply to the term the severe rain 
and hailstorm, and this probably is a question of fact rather 
than the statement of the kind of case. 
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DISPOSITION IN TIIK LOWER COURT 
The trial court, FiiLing without a jury, heard the 
case on t.lu- 2^th day of May, ll)7-, and granted a memorandum 
deci •-; • ii-. i- i • i h * . • • v r -.; h 
a monetary judgment was granted ; .'^  or of : he nniritiffs 
against the defendant In i h«- --nm . ,r $896.1}"' -md costs ui cut. * 
Therea 1" L I T the tinders • ^ -^ . •• i ^
 t, n
 i
 ni- urucii v ns Jr» saici 
memorandum decision, prepared Findings v»i t -ei ^ne Conclusions 
of 1 n v and proposed Judgment and submi , j'd <z:vm : ie Coi irt. 
1^  d appear ^nae i :K U)iirt was nut uitlrely happy ujin 
the items as submit ten by counsel, and ; i^ note< tn t t ne 
actual Judgmere •.«' hi--i'n. -*' .
 f- , . - w 
were prepared : hi. e^urt :i^tii, rather than by :ounseJ, 
and dated the nth dnv nf September, L^:-, th- originals being 
sent directly l^ Lhn Coin l Ln I lie Clerk: ai id liied ' v the 
Clerk on 11 September, 1974. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs and respondents seeks to nave the 
trial Court's judgment affirmed and t oJ .1 c e Led. 
STATEMENT OF FA CITS 
facts. Respondents believe that the facts are as follows: 
That the defendant owned a power plant located in the close 
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proximity to the Santa Clara River near Veyo, Washington 
County, Utah, That the said power plant was a hydro electric 
plant run by water conveyed to the power plant from a point 
upstream on the Santa Clara River near the Baker Reservoir 
and conveyed by virtue of a canal known as hydro canal No. 2. 
After said water runs through the generating plant and other 
plants, it eventually gets back into the Santa Clara River. 
This canal was owned,operated and maintained by the defendant. 
Said canal was built substantially before the action 
and had been operated for many years. While it had been con-
structed to accomodate 16 cubic feet per second of water, it 
had been allowed to fill up and would not actually carry this 
water. At the same time, it is admitted that the diversion 
works located at the head of the canal on the Santa Clara 
River would take the water out of the river up to 16 cubic 
feet. This can be found in the testimony of Wallace K. Smith 
in the transcript commencing on page 91 and running through 
page 96 of said transcript. While 30 cubic feet of water 
were appropriated by the defendant on a non-consumptive use, 
the diversion of 16 cubic feet is claimed to be maximum by 
the defendant. The use of said water was such that in the 
area known as the forebay immediately above the power, plant 
it was held at a level just below the bank, and in the event 
of a decrease in the amount of water running in the canal, 
the nozzle was also decreased in size to assure pressure on 
the head and on the nozzle. 
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Defendant contends that there were at least four 
control devices for achieving the proper pressure and water 
volume, and these are primarily shown in the map offered by 
defendant as defendant's exhibit 3. According to this map 
and the testimony from the engineer of the power company, 
to-wit, Wallace K. Smith, there was a device at the point 
of diversion that automatically allowed a maximum 16 cubic 
feet of water into the canal and no more; an overflow device 
above the plaintiffs1 property to avoid ice jam; a third 
device just downstream from plaintiffs1 property just above 
the forebay which consisted of an area that all water could 
be let out simply by removing boards; and the fourth device, 
which was a nozzle, at the end of the penstock by which the 
pressure of the water onto the water wheel was controlled 
which could be shut off completely or could be opened to ten 
inches. 
Prior to the occasion,the plaintiffs had purchased 
land immediately east of the canal and about 2,000 feet up-
stream from said forebay and power plant and built a home 
thereon. For culinary water they had a well, which was in 
the process of being completed on the 8th of August, 1971, 
the date on which the damage occurred. 
On August 8, 1971, a rainstorm occurred, and al-
though two agents of the defendant were on the ground and 
saw the flooding and saw the damage, they did nothing to 
alleviate same. Although these were experienced men and 
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experienced workmen and employees of the defenda nt aiic 1 knew 
that, l.he actual damage' was occurring and knew that at least 
two of the safety measures, to-wi'. , opening the nozzle and 
opening the boar^'^ c )i i i ;he foreba} • : imed iafoJL alleviate 
the damage and a rove up and down i.he bank after seeing same. 
Also, this type of flooding was common :i n the area and was 
(A e l ] -"I ::i 10 \ i i 1 to the defendant, bi it i lot to the pla:i ntif f s » When 
Dougherty, ont. of tht plaintiffs, made a demand for 
monetary reimbursement on 7 September, 197 , •: va. answered 
• -.:• ~. •'. sjaunt and ... \:,J^W Manager of the 
defendant on 2~> September, l u7i t *•• t hi effect uhaf siK.h 
f l o o d i n , I:. - a. r,r-r.-.i ' • t l i >• • >- - a i -* .; ei: 
heavy rainfall* \v \ M a iL uouid be expected that areas 
which have been flooded in #h*' pa-i vi ! 1 have flooding after 
\ - submitted that Ivan Hunt, foreman oi : he hydro 
plant . m d the gentlemen responsible for *:h>- acta on;- *<-> 
aeit'ii'j.!/1. *'•- immediate area had actual knowledge * . the 
condition ;u the rain and si orn: and was immediately upon the 
area and noticed over* ;« \ -.»n> places and d:I d i iotl i ing. 
n.t same is true ^i j K, i Hadley, another employee of the 
defendant. 
• .:;; ; • . , . - M : t \ h . < *. n 
an area knouu a - .< ( loudburst are^ i and extremely heav) Local 
storms could happen at anytime. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IN ANYWAY COMMIT ERROR 
IN FINDING THAT THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF RESULTED FROM THE 
DEFENDANT'S NEfiTTrtF-NC-F. 
; ; THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT THE STORM OCCURRING ON AUGUST 
8, 1971, WAS NOT AN UNPRECEDENTED ACT OF 
GOD. 
It 1 i : LS been a dmd tted bj the defendant many times 
that this particular storm was no* heavier than those that 
should be expected in the area !» ari, , , '<• * • . r 
: i.e same . udgt had rendered ,i decisior I-J V H 
matter of Erickson v. Bennion? 2b jM%h '..*d r; I , Ci 139, 
- .• • : *i.. - - ( »!. i : i c 
:iv:L:: y negligence. The undersigned, not being satisfied 
with the condition of *hi- complaint :r « * ew of the Kr i A ^>n 
n- . ' — ; •'. ,. .
 (.'• .•'*•] );ut' La! ;i;. IA i.;. h was deencd denied 
th«. iefendant lor <-« 1 I purposes. ' seems rathe1" ridiculous 
* Lb ; ! line to be talking .•.•*•.'• ; * r^i r« * t<Jf^!id -
J iprecedented severity aJter -he Letter oi Mr. Hansen, 
which is defendant's exhibit 1, responding to Mr, Dougherty1s 
request for reimbursement for f 1 ooci damage Mr, Hanson In his 
letter termed the storm oi August 8th a heavy rainfall. He 
also indicated that such flooding K M occurred in ,.: similar 
way a fter heav y ran nfa • - ' •'.»•:!• ,vit. 
about the condition of the canal and the duty of maintenance 
which, of course, is established b\ ;.;--cj--. -,n(- -•.< . :: *"es 
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that iiic 'St fl oodi ng of the same type can be expected after 
every rainfall of the amount which was experienced on • 
AlJJ'.U -.1 I h e 's! I h • 
Ai the trial of the matter, the defendant had 
failed :.^- produce rainfall records in, their possession 
> • .!.'-•. m o i iths before that they would 
' ».: required li- --roduce same at the time af i 'M:)I, JIG bearing 
5
 • h« undersigned had examined ja H ^-c >-d.-* i , -f-< ! 
. •. ••.'.! • .id records, t^^j.i* ;«:, hui-r., uould 
testify on these items based upon the notes ot in- undersigned 
made for sa :I d exam3 natI on, rather tha s - ~i< »: 
to get the rainfa] ] records which wouLo rive taken approximately 
two or three hours. These readings were taken at •n* I,o. 2 
plant wiii cl 1 i s a • qi lest::i on of some 3,0 • ' * rvtr 
Dougherty residence. in is procedure was explained and \h> 
preliminary items t^ ) commencing with page ! M- aaa Latin ^oes 
! : . . , :~. • h notes ii:*cl t-een made, «11 
* '^ h i ' n. wort.- affirmed \ M- liunt and admitted that, in his 
opinion lu ' Sl N vexe proper reading a ^  1 ala~a • >• *• h*s 
recordQr , continued through page 20 from page 14 of 
•.ru 7 ms^ra )\.* r- i- noted there are several days in which 
- idino -i' * *' (-ss of the readi ng on 8 August,, 1^71 , 
which is 1, . . ':. the 10th of October, I960, on page 19, 
there i^ a notation *t;wo inches, I n parenthesis, 'maybe 
•, a 1 10tati on of 1« 87 Thei 1- are 
several other notations during the period of examination 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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- •<•; -•..-. • ••• : i t . <_ -t LI_ ;n excess of an inch, 
- r . ;" February. lcuy« on page 1 % 1 ^ inches; 1 March, 
M) / 1 ' * ,,., ->, ±.u3 inches; 26 March, il 58 on page 19, 1 50 
! ^ oruary, 19,59 on page 1 9, 1.02 inches; and Ir> 
February, J ^ " 9 . ] .31 inches shown on page 19. Under the 
c ond :l t :i : 1 • e s e p r e c I p a 11 on r e p o r t: s , I. o g e t: h e r wi th Mr. 
Hansen 1s letter, which is plaintiffs 1 exhibit ] , which is 
identified during * "he same questioning of Mr. Hunt, there is 
was i lot an ui lprecedented act of God 
.jnd \\.- . ^  t'-;"1 rii:>i should have been anticipated. 
The statute that actual ly control s this matter 
7 - . oimply sets forth, the duties of owners of 
ditches. 1'h 1 ;-t amplification of this statute that the 
undors i n,ne<| hnt: In en /ihli in I" I I ir f i flu Erickson case, 
quoted earlier, which Is actually a decision of this Dougherty 
case i n reverse, <.\ - he Erickson case the Supreme Court has ': 
set oi it the s tati itc , -. i o-n 7 ":l~ ! - - : • 1 f|1 A i! ( * 5 *. /:nid f he provi-
sions thereof and set,-: ost M M . ,iut .-t i;( rson in control of 
water as i t relates to damaginn rr^iM-i-t' - * '^ hs i - Jn | he 
Erickson case *. Court has indicated that there does have 
to be specific negligence. Under these conditions, there is 
n o q U e s t i on tha t th e 11: i a I j i id g e tl \a L t: 11 :i e d b o th o f t:h e s e 
cases and was aware of the action < < ;he Supreme Court in 
his memorandum decision wa - thinking specifically ot the 
Erickson case, ai id 1 le ma de ;i• fI iici:i ng that at tl le :;«:e of 
the rainstorm the defendent's agents undertook none of: the 
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prophylactic measures available to them to reduce the volume 
of water in the canal as it passed the plaintiffs1 home, i.e. 
opening the overflow of the Baker Dam, opening the overflows 
at the head of the penstock; opening the penstock to its 
fullest capacity as it passes through the hydro electric 
plant. The Court further in making its memorandum decision 
pertaining to Title 73-1-8, UCA 1953, in codification thereof 
cited Washington Canal Company v. Provo Bench Canal and 
Irrigation Company, 116 U. 128, 208 P.2d 1119, as to the 
degree of care of hazards reasonably to be anticipated and 
affirms same in the Erickson v. Bennion case previously cited. 
He made a finding that the defendant was aware that the plain-
tiff had constructed a home in the immediate vicinity of the 
canal and in an area where it overflowed its banks on pre-
vious occasions. Also, he made a finding that the capacity 
of the canal had been decreased by reason of the use made of 
it by the defendant and the maintenance practices employed, 
that nothing was done to relieve or minimize the danger to 
plaintiffs1 property. He made the specific finding that the 
failure to act, under the circumstances, was negligent con-
duct and a breach of the duty impressed upon said water user 
under Section 73-1-8, UCA 1953. These findings coupled with 
the finding of an unsatisfactory maintenance practice very 
definitely places negligence on the defendant and certainly 
that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has a duty of 
upholding the finding of the trial court where there is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sufficient evidence to justify same. These items were re-
incorporated into Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
by the trial court in Einding 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, and 
bearing in mind these were promulgated by the Court and 
were based upon specific items of evidence, the Supreme Court 
of Utah has no basis on which to set aside these items. 
There is no support for appellant's contention that this 
was an unprecedented act of God which should not have been 
anticipated. 
POINT I (B) 
(B) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS 
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF ITS CANAL. 
There is no question that such findings were made 
both in the memorandum decision and in the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law as promulgated by the Court. There 
are certain and very definite findings of evidence of the 
negligence in two respects based upon ample evidence. 
The first of these is that there was a specific 
finding of negligence in the maintenance of an operation of 
the canal on a day-to-day basis. Page 63 of the transcript 
in the testimony of Jacob Jones and running several pages 
thereafter, bearing in mind that Mr. Jones was a former 
employee of the power company and had for a long period of 
time been involved in the maintenance of this specific canal, 
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stated that the matter should have been cleaned out, and that 
the matter had not been properly maintained. This starts at 
line 14 on page 63 and runs through page 80. The specific 
items of interest, in addition to the generalization, is Mr. 
Jones statement on page 63 to the effect that the canal should 
have been cleaned out more often, using the term "we". Also, 
on page 64 his statement that the normal flood procedure was 
to jerk out the boards below the house and let the water in 
the forebay down. The items were specifically identified by 
Mr. Jones on page 64 as the security measures identified in 
defendant's exhibit 3, which is the map of the canal. Also, 
on page 65, Mr. Jones indicated there had been considerable 
flooding prior to this, and that these procedures were known 
to the personnel. On page 73 Mr. Jones indicated this was not 
an unusual flow, and he indicated that in previous times there 
had been more water in the canal than there was on this partic-
ular day. This specific statement is found at line 10 on page 
73. On pages 79 and 80 there is a discussion of moving the 
boards on the forebay of the bay, which Mr. Jones indicated 
that had this been done, the water level could have been 
lowered some 24 to 30 inches. This was an experienced main-
tenance man on this canal. Certainly this evidence alone was 
sufficient to find the defendant negligent in its maintenance 
and operation of the canal, to say nothing of the acknowledge-
ment by Mr. Hansen that there was nothing unusual about the 
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storm which is plaintiffs1 exhibit 1. Bearing in mind that 
on all these items the trial court heard the witnesses, saw 
the demeanor, and made his own decision as to the effect of 
the testimony and the weight he gave the testimony. There is 
no basis for any statement that there was not sufficient 
evidence to support a finding. It would seem that appellant 
should be saying that the findings were not approved of by 
the appellant. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FAILING TO MAKE A 
FINDING OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS. 
There is no question that as of the 8th of August, 
1971, the defense of contributory negligence was still valid 
under the Utah law. 
Apparently the negligence of the plaintiffs that 
is contended to be contributory negligence by the defendant 
is building below the canal. There is actually no allegation 
of any negligence on the part of the defendant that can be 
identified as such. It would seem that the defendant is 
contending that anyone that is fool enough to build below 
one of their canals is automatically contributorily negligent. 
In all probability this is the feeling of the defendant inas-
much as they did nothing to alleviate the damage when they 
saw it happening. They simply took the attitude that anyone 
that was unfortunate to own land below the canal assumed all 
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risk of the canal running over regardless of the fact that 
there was no unprecedented storm or any other item, and even 
when defendant's agents were actually on the ground, they 
did nothing to alleviate the damage, although in a question 
of a moment or two, they could have opened the penstock and 
jerked the boards out of the forebay. The only item complained 
of in appellant's brief is in the second paragraph of Point 
II: 
"The evidence is undisputed that the plaintiffs 
knew of the location of the canal and of the fact 
that their property was on a lower elevation than 
the canal long before they purchased the property 
and constructed their house and culinary well.11 
There is actually nothing else even stated in defendant's 
brief that could be termed contributory negligence. Under 
these conditions it would seem that the defendant is placing 
everyone on notice that if you own property below any canal 
or operation of the defendant's, they automatically assume 
all risk of being there regardless of what the defendant does. 
Again, this is an item that the trier of fact had to determine, 
and the trier of fact has determined that there was no con-
tributory negligence. This is found in the first full para-
graph on page 4 of the Memorandum Decision and paragraph 10 
of the Findings of Fact. Again, the trier of the facts saw 
the witnesses on the witness stand, heard the testimony and 
judged from the demeanor of the witnesses whether or not there 
was any contributory negligence. There is no question that 
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the transcript is full of testimony upon which anyone is 
justified in finding that there was no contributory negli-
gence. 
The difference between this and the Erickson case 
in this point is that in the Erickson case neither the plain-
tiff or his predecessor in interest had clogged a barrow pit 
on the side of a road and failed to provide drainage there-
under by a culvert or some other means. There is nothing 
in the evidence to show how plaintiff Dougherty could either 
have anticipated or prevented the damage to his property in 
the instant case. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE DAMAGE COM-
PLAINED OF. 
This is no question that the trial court approached 
this matter specifically with the Erickson case in mind and 
the fact that the negligence complained of had to cause the 
damage. Also, there is no question that counsel approached 
it on the same basis. On the Erickson case being promulgated 
and on 26 February, 1974, plaintiffs1 counsel feeling that 
his complaint was insufficient in the allegations of negli-
gence, specifically made a motion to amend alleging the 
specific acts of negligence, to-wit, negligent failure to 
control the water in the canal, and that they failed to keep 
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the canal dug out, failed to keep the banks in a sufficient 
state of repair so that the water in the canal together with 
the usual runoff of storms could be carried away by the canal, 
and specifically alleged that the water overflowed the banks 
and did the damage complained of. In addition, an amended 
complaint was filed in March of 1974, two months before the 
trial, again alleging these specific acts of negligence. 
There is no question this case was tried with the Erickson 
case in mind. 
As far as the defendant was concerned, there is 
no question that the matter was approached and tried com-
pletely from the standpoint of the Erickson case. Mr. 
Erickson1s counsel was one of the counsel for the defendant 
and appellant in the instant case, and there can be no 
question that the power company approached this matter 
strictly from the standpoint of the Erickson case with full 
knowledge of the findings of the Erickson case and the de-
cision of same and the act of the Supreme Court in upholding 
same, the Erickson case being dated 9 November, 1972 and 
being in various preliminary reports and publications in 1973, 
and the instant case being tried in May of 1974. 
Bearing in mind that the trier of the facts.was 
also the trier of facts in the Erickson case and made specific 
findings of damage, negligent acts of the defendant causing 
the damage, and the failure of the defendant to prove its 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-16-
contentions of contributory negligence, there can be no 
question that the trial court is justified in its finding 
that the negligent acts of the defendant were the proximate 
cause of the damage to the plaintiffs. 
Under these conditions there can be no bona fide 
contention that the defendant's negligence was not the 
proximate cause of the damage complained of, and under 
these conditions, again, the Court saw the witnesses, 
heard their statements, saw the demeanor of the witnesses 
and considered the physical evidence submitted, being pri-
marily the map which is defendant's exhibit 3, and the 
letter from Mr. Hansen which is plaintiffs' exhibit 1. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no conclusion except that the trial 
court's judgment should be affirmed and collected. 
Respep-feful ly submi11 ed, 
PATRICK H. FENTjOff 
Attorney for Respondents 
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